“Hegemonic Science” : Critique Strands, Counterstrategies, and Their Paradigmatic Premises by KUHN Michael
“Hegemonic Science”:
Critique Strands,Counterstrategies,
and Their Paradigmatic Premises
Michael Kuhn
Introduction
Following the postcolonial critique of the universalized European sciences,
the era of globalisation and the new wave of internationalisation of
sciences initiated by the global competition of nation-states about
knowledge has confronted the so-called “Western” social sciences with a
new wave of critique, the most radical version of which is the notion of
“intellectual imperialism” and the like (for example, see Alatas 2000).1 In
this chapter I will discuss the most typical variations of the critique the so-
called Western sciences are facing today.
Four types of theoretical critiques populate the current critical discourses
about the world science arena focusing on the universalisation of the
“Western” concept of science and theories:
A. Critiquing theories of the Western sciences
B. Critique of the world science arena
C. Critiquing the Western way of theorizing, their epistemologies
I hold that these types of critiques represent the currently most
prominent theoretical oppositions to the European model of theorising in
the social sciences. I will not make any attempt to collect all the numerous
examples and authors across the world, which could illustrate my
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1 See also M. Kuhn, “Academic Dependence̶Neither a Theory of nor a Strategy against
Hegemonic Sciences,” in M. Kuhn and J. Kabbanji (eds), Arab Social Thoughts in International
Knowledge Encounters (Forthcoming, 2013).
discussions. The fashion to support arguments by quoting the more authors
the better is part of a discourse style that seems to believe that the more
theoreticians share a theory the more it must be theoretically convincing.
I discuss these types along the typical argumentative architecture of
their thoughts, representing a typical type of argumentation; again,
representing not in any quantitative sense, but with regard to their
argumentative structure and their ways of proving thoughts.
I also need to make a remark about the object of these variations of
critique, the so-called “Western” sciences and theories. I hold that
attributing a geographical space to a theory or a particular way of
theorizing, is a cognitive creature of the very “Western” science model it
criticises. To put it in other words: The notion of a spatially constructed
concept of science, the distinction of science along a “where” is the result
of the very view of the science model created by the European science
approach, that has been developed through the scientific revolution starting
from the seventeenth century and from there universalized across the
world.
I also hold that the following discussed variations of critiquing the
bourgeois sciences can only be created by the way of thinking the
bourgeois sciences have established with their critique of the classical
philosophies and successfully spread across the world as the universal
model of science.2 Thus̶this is what I will try to show̶this critique,
more precisely their particular way on constructing their critical thoughts,




2 The bourgeois model of scientific thinking means the sciences that have been established
through the scientific revolution starting from the seventeenth century replacing classical
philosophies. This approach to science is based on a particular relation between the thinking
subject and its objects, characterized by the subordination of thoughts under the commands of
the reified social objectives incorporated in the objects of thoughts. Opposing the speculative
nature of the classical philosophies which developed their theories from ideas, the bourgeois
concept of scientific thinking approaches the objects of thoughts with a variation of speculative
thinking, ex ante constructed models they measure against the objects of thoughts, thus
cognitively travelling between their ex ante ideas and the empirical appearance of their object of
thoughts. They thus enthrone the nonunderstood appearance of things as an instance proving or
disproving their modeled theories. This is the epistemological contradiction of a cognitive
realism, the cognitive element of the bourgeois concepts of thoughts, Comte so clearly discloses
in his tautological notion of “studying the real facts.” See Michael Kuhn, The World Social
Science System (forthcoming).
Critique Strands
A. Critiquing Western “Nonsuitable” Theories̶Provicialising Social
Thinking?
The postcolonial critique of the Western sciences summarized its
opposition against Western sciences under the notion of “Eurocentrism,”
accusing the Western sciences and theories of imposing the Western
interpretations of the world and interpreting their society model as the
mission of mankind of the world. The critique of concepts such as
“modernity,” presenting the Western society model as if the Western
model of society, economy, and politics was representingthe natural
development of mankind’ s history, represented an opposition to the
Western sciences, arguing against the naturalisation of the Western society
model that oppressed the world, namely the world of the developing
countries.
Obviously aware of a possible misinterpretation of this critique of
“Eurocentrism,” Said (2001 [1978]) thought he should warn against this
critique of a local ethnocentrism toward a science world that replaces the
monopoly of the Eurocentric worldview by a science world that consists of
a multiplicity of ethnocentrisms.
This is exactly what the critique of the Western science in the era of
globalisation does, obviously after any model of an alternative society had
been abolished from the world’ s landscape with the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and critical thinking had been intellectually expropriated of
the option to think in alternative society systems and, thus, in systemic
thinking as such.3 Abjuring the option of systemic thinking and critique,
the postcolonial critique of the Westerns sciences dropped back into
claiming against the monopole of the Western world interpretations to
allow for a complimentary the parochial view replacing the monopole of
the parochial view of the European sciences with the multi-plicity of
parochialisms. Exactly this, creating a world of multiple parochialisms, is
the idea of the current global concept in organisations like the International
Sociology Association, the idea of regionalising the social sciences, put
into practice by localising the social science theory production that has its
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3 See Michael Kuhn, “Facing a Scientific Multiversalism̶Dynamics of International Social
Science Knowledge Accumulations in the Era of Globalization,” In Michael Kuhn and Doris
Weidemann (eds.), Internationalization of the Social Sciences: Asia̶Latin America̶Middle
East̶Africa̶Eurasia (S. 379-409). Bielefeld: transcript.
theoretical point of departure in critiquing Western theories with the notion
of the “here nonapplicable” Western theories.
The most typical critique of the “Western” theories in the era of
globalisation coming from various global regions argues that theories
created in the Western sciences are “nonsuitable” or “not applicable” to
particular local context and do not allow an analysis of the social beyond
the Western societies. There are numerous variations of this type of
critique questioning the local applicability of theories born in the Western
sciences, starting from the complaint of a mismatch between the Western
theories and the particularism of local phenomena and continuing to the
nonapplicability of Western theories beyond the Western societies.
There is no doubt: The Western sciences succeeded in populating the
world of sciences with their ideological worldviews. Theories about
“modernity” and alike have established the naturalised Western society
model as the model of “civilisation,” and the “rest of the world” as on its
way towards what time will bring about anyway̶just as if these Western
ideologies wanted to cartoon the historical automatism of “Historical
Materialism.” These Western ideologies have attracted massive critique,
which has been quite easily absorbed by the Western sciences and
meanwhile made part of its mainstream thinking, peacefully coexisting in a
pluralistic science world̶a coexistence that was always denied by the
Western sciences to social theories emanating from the former Soviet
Union. Unlike many critics, I argue that it is the dogma of a pluralism of
thoughts, the many variations of denying the objectivity of thoughts (latest
popular version Bashkar4) and its epistemological relativisms, that is the
strongest weapon of the bourgeois sciences against any critique, and that it
is this relativism that absorbs the critique of the knowledge this science
created and creates̶given that the critique shares this epistemological
relativism. In most case it does.
Indeed, looking at how this critique argues, looking at the
argumentative structure of thoughts critiquing Western theories by
questioning their geographical reach can be considered as a classical
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4 Bhaskar’s variation (1997 [1975]) to confirm the dogma of the bourgeois sciences, denying the
objectivity of knowledge, reveals how much thinking can obey the thinker’s purpose of what he
wants to prove. Concluding from the fact, that we “transform” our knowledge once we face new
developments in the world, that we correct or amend our knowledge, that therefore, this
knowledge is never objective, only proves what this thinker thinks about knowledge, he can
obviously only perceive as a unquestionable dogma or an ever relativized knowledge.
example for critiquing theories without questioning their thoughts and,
instead, rather complimenting them with other, mostly own, local thoughts.
How does the critique of a theory that accuses this theory with the
argument that it cannot be applied to a local context argue? Most
obviously, this critique implies the assumption that the so critiqued
Western theories are acceptable theories in the context of the Western
societies, but elsewhere not. However, how is this possible to argue that a
theory might be correct, somewhere else, in the West, but not beyond, in
other parts of the world? How does this work, that a theory can be a right
theory there and is a wrong theory here?
The first option, phrasing a critique of a theory as nonsuitable for a
particular local context, appears as if it was a̶purposeful̶misconception
of the object of the critiqued theory: If this critique of a nonapplicable
theory wants to say that the Western theory is not suitable, because it is a
theory about phenomena that do not exist in the non-Western local context
and can thus not be valid in the non-Western social world, then this is not a
critique of the Western theory or its validity, but just stating that the
Western theory is about another object of thought, which only exists in the
Western social reality but not elsewhere. If the local context is not the same
context as the critiqued theory is about, then this is not a critique of this
theory and its lacking applicability, but the simply the observation that the
objects of theorizing are not the same. Accusing a theory of not reflecting
on the topic the critique wishes to reflect on, is not a critique of that theory.
It just states, that the opposed theory does not think about the things the
criticism would like it to think about.
Given the second option, that the critiqued theory however insists that
it is about the very same objects of thought, then one cannot accuse this
theory of not being here or there not applicable, but must discuss the
theoretical faults of this theory̶here and there. A theory cannot be a
theory that is a theory about the same objects of thoughts and that is valid
somewhere and nonvalid somewhere else, as long as it is about the same
objects of thoughts.
However, though the critical notion of a “nonsuitable” theory is
presented as if it is implies a critique of the “nonsuitable” theory, reflecting
on the thoughts and arguments in this type of critique of a theory by
accusing it of being not applicable is not the real purpose of this format of
critique. If this was the case it would disprove the arguments of this theory
no matter what the local context or the object of this theory is. A critique
that wants to know if a theory is false or not would have to trace the theory’s
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arguments no matter where the social phenomena exist and where not. The
notion of a locally nonsuitable theory, however, does not say that a theory
is wrong or right, no matter where. It does not even want to discuss the
thoughts of the theory. It rather seeks to reject theories without discussing
their thoughts. It thus establishes claims, instead, to compliment thoughts
its does not want to question or even discuss, with other thoughts, without
saying what is wrong or right about the thoughts, which this notion though
discusses through the gesture of an opposition.
Indigenisation: Opposing the Western science monopole with the
parochialism of thinking
Sato’ s thoughts (2010) about how to oppose the nonsuitable Western
knowledge Sato’s thoughts (2010) about how to oppose the nonsuitable
Western knowledge and to compliment it with “authentic” knowledge are
very instructive to understand the nature of indigenized knowledge: Both
methodologically as content wise the indigenisation of knowledge rejects,
not critiques, Western thoughts and Western thinking and constructs the
suitable knowledge as a variation of Western theories and theorizing. This
is not to say, that there are no theories that originated from the knowledge
traditions beyond the Western sciences they excluded from their concept of
scientific knowledge by discriminating this knowledge as indigenous
knowledge. It is the indigenization of theorizing as a scientific strategy
against the Western science that opposes the Western theories by
reproducing both their theoretical constructs as their way of theorizing.
(See also D. Weidemann in chapter 6 in this volume.)
Methodologically it constructs its knowledge as a comparison
between the indigenized knowledge and the rejected Western knowledge,
taking the rejected Western knowledge as the discrete implicit tertium
comparationis. Content wise it introduces, here the East Asian, categories,
here “aidagara” and “guanxi,” rejecting the Western category, here “social
capital,” as the more appropriate East Asian interpretation of these very
categories. Aidagara or guanxi in Sato’s critique of the notion of social
capital are promoted to better understand what both the Western and the
East Asian categories share; and what they share are the theoretical
abstractions articulated in the notion of social capital originating from the
Western society model this comparison seemingly considers as the nature
of thoughts about the social.
Thus, indigenized knowledge consists of a gesture of critique that not
only never questions the Western theories nor the Western way of
theorizing, but ennobles Western thoughts as the categorial reference basis
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for the indigenised knowledge as variations of the Western thoughts.
How far away this gesture of opposition to Western theories is from
critiquing these theories can be seen if one has a glimpse at an example of a
theory that accuses a Western theory of being “nonsuitable” in a local
context, in our example a discussion about a sociological topic, the
“Western” category of “social capital,” which is accused not being
applicable to East Asian contexts and its East Asian complimentary
categories aidagara for Japan and guanxi for China.
Taking Sato’s critique and discussion of the above categories as an
arbitrary example from the numerous variations of this format of critique
populating the world of theorizing mainly in developing countries, in this
case in East Asia, and what he says about the difference between the Asian
and the Western categories of “social capital”5 and “aidagara,” illustrates
how much this critique insinuates itself as being a critique of Western
categories and how far away such critique is from really critiquing these
Western thoughts, which stereotype East Asians with the well known
scientific cliché as “collectivists.” (The most prominent example are
Hofstede 1984 or Ruth Benedict.) Indeed, the Asian categories, may they
be the Japanese version aidagara or the Chinese version guanxi, within
Sato’ s discussions about the question “why is social capital, and not
“aidagara,” “en” or “guanxi,” the universal sociological concept that
describes social relations” (Sato 2010: 193), even reproduce in their
comparison with the Western categories the racist stereotypes Western
theories have created about East Asia: Beyond any critique of the false
dichotomy of individualism versus collectivism Sato’ s critique of the
nonapplicable notion of social capital in an East Asian contexts just
reverses the stereotype value judgments by accusing the Western theories
not of any false thoughts in this dichotomy, but of an a Western
individualism that, as he feels he needs to say, is ignorant about the
collective, methodologically phrased, what he calls the “contextuals”:
Unlike individuals, contextuals which represent actors in methodological
contextualism, do not give priority to autonomy and independence but
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5 It is another sociological Marxist’ s, Bourdieu’ s privilege to have created a concept, social
capital, that no Asian scholar wants to critique. Is it so difficult to see the theoretical mistake, not
to mention the political purpose, establishing those, the have-nots, who have nothing but
“durable networks” with a sudden “capital,” capitalists would never need, since they own
capital?
are dependent on other contextuals (ibid.: 14).
Constructing “contextuals” without being individuals is as false as the
whole idea of thinking about societal subjects without societies and then to
denounce societies as collectives without individuals or as individuals that
do not respect the “contextuals.” While the first version of an false
sociological opposition of two false abstractions aims at casting aspersions
on Asians as “collectivists,” the critique coming from the “contextualists”
aims at casting aspersions on Westerners as “individualists.”
In our example Sato even realizes that his interpretation of the Asian
categories substantially do not differ from the critiqued Western terms.
Why is social capital, rather than aidagara and en, popular among
sociologists worldwide, even though the terms are similar? (ibid.:
193)
So what is the problem about social capital if it is so similar to the Asian
categories? Since his critique is not a critique of the Western categories,
they are according to him even “similar,” his critique that pretends being a
critique of the Western categories, is a critique about the global intellectual
leadership, their global popularity. Discussing the explanatory value of
theories is not a concern of the critique that accuses Western theories as
elsewhere being nonsuitable, applicable, and alike. This critique only plays
with the gesture of a critique of theories and rather discusses the question,
Which theory, which provincialism, has the say in the world of theories?6
In fact, as this example shows, this critique, of a nonsuitable theory
not only does not critique the Western stereotyped value judgments about
“Asians,” it builds on their false abstractions, reproduces their argumentative
structure as their racist categories, reverses their value judgments, and thus
supports the universal reign of the Western theories. This critique has not
only learned its lesson from the bourgeois science, it is a very part of its
way of thinking as of its way of disputing.
Departed from the critique of a nonsuitable theory and once arrived at
the critique of the global leadership of Western theories, various strands of
arguing are from here being developed and elaborated. They range from
creating alternative, mostly “Southern” theories, which are in most cases
also no critique of Western theories, but alternative views based on the
same Western approach of thinking, towards quarrelling about how the
Western leadership could be eroded, as Sato does in his case for the global
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ambitions of the Japanese academia.
What all these variation of critiquing Western theories as being
nonsuitable theories have in-common is that they do not question or erode
the persuasive basis of Western theories that is, by critically tracing the
cognitive architecture of their thoughts. They do in some cases argue
against their main ideological messages and thus question the Western
theory monopoly (the most current prominent example is Connell 2007),
but they rarely attack their theories by critically tracing the argumentative
structure of thoughts through which the Western theories are constructed
and through which they gain their intellectual credibility.7 Thus, by leaving
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6 As if Sato wants to prove my argument that critically reflecting on theories and raising the
question about who dominates the global discourses are opposing issues, Sato argues that
theories become more dominate the shallower they are: “I would argue that thin concepts spread
faster among sociologists than thick concepts, which are loaded with local meanings. This is
because when individuals are exposed to a concept and try to understand it, a thin concept has
lighter cognitive burdens on its receivers than a thick concept” (Sato 2010: 197). If one leaves
aside that this is not a compliment for the world social sciences, his argument clarifies this: To
compete with Western theories about who has the say in the global science arena, he calls their
international popularity, and without any hesitation he suggests the creation of a local theory that
is shallower as any Western theory could ever be: “The second strategy is a particularism-to-
universalism-to-particularism strategy. Using this strategy, the Japanese sociologist would invent
a broad concept that covers both Japanese and the Western types of social relations, as well as the
Chinese type. The Japanese sociologists could then derive local concepts such as aidagara and
guanxi from the more general concept. Generally, this is an authentic scientific strategy and is,
therefore, preferable” (ibid.:199). The “preferable” strategy for creating new global “popular”
theories is: “Inventing” a theory that is “broad,” “thin” and “authentic.” The conceptual
conservatism uncritically fostering the national histories in this opposition against Western
thoughts is obvious. This, not critiquing but competing with Western theories via conserving
uncritical national historical concepts is the concern of critiquing Western theories in the era of
globalisation in which competition about the global popularity of thoughts is ascendant; in such a
competition, sound thinking is̶very frankly̶considered as being quite disturbing.
7 Maybe the most striking examples of critiquing the ideological effects of Western theories
without critiquing the theories are the notions of “modernity” for sociology and the notion of
“globalisation” for economics. While the critique of the ideological effects of the notion of
“modernity,” claiming that the Western model of society represents the history of mankind, is
most common, and the “notion” of “globalisation,” a term spatialising a nameless something,
might also raise some concerns about its ideological implications, the theories summarized by
the these notions have rarely been critically contested. It is this circumscribed opposition,
restricted on critiquing these theories’ ideological impact, that leaves the arguments from which
these theories are constructed untouched, and thus allow them to be acknowledged worldwide as
an explanation of what is happening in the world. The rest, the extent to which such theories are
acknowledged, is a matter of nonscientific means of imposing such theories as the global
theoretical standards.
the cognitive basis of the Western theories, the argumentative structure of
their thoughts, not only untouched but in many cases even reproducing and
arguing with them and creating an alternative ethnocentrism, as in the
above case about East Asian sociology, it is not only not surprising that
such kind of critique does not only not erode the persuasive basis of the
Western theory bodies. It rather also transforms the universalisation of the
Western parochial knowledge toward a global knowledge arena consisting
of a multiplicity of competing and coexisting parochialisms, competing
about which theory has the leadership in the global science arena.
Indeed, accusing Western theories via a new figuring of the notion of
“Eurocentrism” in the era of globalisation is an interpretation of an older
question that asks: How do the Western theories shape the “captive minds”
of academics? (Alatas 1974), except that now the question has become:
Which parochial sciences dominate the scientific discourses in the
globalising science world? No doubt, it is the European sciences, which
have imposed their views about the world on the world. However, making
the opposition to the European sciences a matter of the global scientific
leadership and shifting the theoretical leadership from the European
monopoly toward a multiplicity of parochial world interpretations, does not
only leave the Western theories uncritiqued; just as if they want to ignore
Said’s warnings, this critique of elsewhere locally nonapplicable theories
rather aims at replacing the Western theoretical leadership with the
multiplicity of spatially restricted ways of theorizing, the final globalisation
of very bourgeois concept of science introduced to the world with the most
active support of those who might believe to critique the Western model of
science or their theories. It is another irony of the world sciences that its
major current approach critiquing Western theories in the era of a
globalising science arena helps to strengthen and globalise the position of
the Western way of theorizing.8
B. The World Science Arena̶A Battlefield of National Science
Communities?
A second strand of critique spread across the world and mainly articulated
by social scientists in the so-called developing countries critically discusses
not the Western theories, but the world science arena. It opposes mostly
with very radical terms the world science system, ranging from the more
modest notions about inequalitities toward the more radical version of
accusing the Western sciences of a “scientific imperialism” (Alatas 2003)
and alike. (See chapter Okamoto in this book.) This critique accuses the
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Western sciences of “dominating” (…) hegemonizing (….) an “unequal”
or “asymmetric” (Keim 2008) science system, mainly arguing that the
“peripheric” sciences are ruled by “scientific centres”̶and do not notice
that all these complaints about the conditions under which social scientists
around the world accumulate knowledge operate with the major constructs
of this science system that implies these conditions as its̶inevitable̶
outcomes.
Though one could argue that the critique of the world science arena in
which social sciences around the world produce knowledge does of course
not oppose the thoughts reigning the world knowledge productions, since
this is not their topic, one could assume that such critique, that excludes the
theoretical substance of thoughts from their agenda, cannot be of such an
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8 It is a very particular double irony in the history of the world sciences that it is the correct
opposition of academics from developing countries against a false opposing theory, their critique
of the “Historical Materialism”, an ideology the Soviet Union had established against the
Western ideology production and spread across the world as an opposing world view, mainly
into the colonised world supporting their fights for independence, that this critique of the Soviet
Union ideologies has helped to established space, the epistemological creature of the bourgeois
sciences, as a worldwide acknowledged epistemological dimension, more than the universalisation
of the bourgeois concept of science itself ever could. Chakrabarty’s error in his opposition
against “Historical Materialism”̶a historical epistemological twofold accident, the wrong self-
critique of a wrong theory, the ideology of the Soviet Union, an interpretation of Marx as a type
of scientific religion̶is that he critiques Marx via critiquing a caricaturelike Marx
interpretation, that could not more contradict Marx’s theories. It was Engels, who was often
critiqued by Marx, when Engels used the term “Marxism,” thus transforming Marx theories
about capitalism into an approach to science, who perpetrated the caricaturelike notion of the
“Historical Materialism.” First, uncritically adopted by social movements against colonialism
and used for the independence of colonial countries, then, once the former colonies became
independent, critiqued by the same academics in the new states as an intervention into their local
national identity-building process, this science ideology of the Soviet Union was seen by
theorists from the periphery as a theory that did not know any “where,” that is, did not allow the
creation their own local worldviews. In fact, the Soviet ideology subsumed the whole world
under its odd dogma of an historical automatism, in which authorities in the Soviet Union did not
themselves believe. The impact of introducing the “where” as an epistemological dimension of
thoughts since then has flourished as an opposition against the Western sciences, under the
notion of indigenous sciences, Southern sciences, and the like. In any case, it was and is this
opposition against the Western theories that paved the way for universalising the “where,” space,
mostly politically defined, as a worldwide epistemological dimension of science, thus extending
the bourgeois concept of science in away the bourgeois sciences never could, due to its own very
political, i.e., nationalized “where.” Since then, the world of sciences consists of the global
theoretical roundabout of no-where valid theories. On international science discourses, the circle
of a spatialised expertise about the local “wheres” of knowledge results in the global
nondiscourse culture among the many local expertises.
importance. However, more than any critique of thoughts and theories, it is
this critique of the world science system that represents the most prominent
opposition to what is called the “hegemonic sciences,” a critique originating
from the developing countries, meanwhile shared as a kind of global
synonym for a critique of the global science world.
In the following section I will not discuss all the different variations
and aspects of this critique strand of the world science arena, but just raise
some questions about the key scientific subject populating all those critical
reflections about the global science arena, that is the “national science
communities,” the unquestioned construct also uncritically used by the
above radical critique of the global science arena. Discussing this, the
subject all these variations of critique argue with the notion of a world
science system consisting of “national science communities,” discloses the
tragic errors of this critique as its affirmative standpoint.
Indeed, this idea of a science community as the subject populating the
world science arena, shared by the most radical critique of the global
science arena, is one of these typical constructs of the bourgeois sciences,
namely sociology, everywhere seeing “communities,” constructed from
wherever sociologists find people who have nothing in-common but
competing or opposing interests. In this case, the subject populating the
world science arena, the “national science communities,” are constructed̶
again mainly by sociologists, however used by all disciplines in their
discourses about the world sciences̶from the very competitive and
opposing interests academics have within the Western concept of science
via the organisation of science as a competition about knowledge.
National social science communities, the nowhere questioned subjects
of the world science system, are imagined as the internationally competing
subjects, organisational entities of academics constructed from simply
sharing the same nationality. This notion of national science communities
seriously seems to believe that academics working internationally are on an
international mission representing a national entity in their battles against
other national science communities about how much they, the national
science communities, participate in what this critique calls the “growth of
knowledge.” Do they seriously want to say that scientists attending
conferences, publishing books, reflecting on theories from other scientists
abroad or collaborating in research projects, according to the imaginary
world of these critical theories, are all trying to contribute to a competition
among national science communities to beat each other in producing more
knowledge than the other national science community? They do. Are they
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seriously thinking an internationally acting academic is a kind of
intellectual soldier gathered and organised in national science entity
fighting a battle between national science organisations from different
countries?
One could already learn from a glimpse of the historic emergence of
the disciplinary specialisation of social sciences that the Western model of
nation-based societies organises its knowledge production as a scientifically
specialised disciplinary service and by no means as a national entity or a
national organisation. This is why such a thing as a national science
community, gathering the social sciences under a national entity, nowhere
exists, neither via a national institutional body nor via a nationally unified
theoretical approach (see for example, Wallerstein et al. 1996).
There is no such thing as the French, Japanese, or Indonesian social
sciences. There are social sciences in these countries, working under the
same conditions, rules, and infrastructures of national science policies, but
the sciences are not a nationally constructed entity. Sciences anywhere in
the world are constructed along their scientific specialisations and the
according disciplinary organisations, and the history of science is the
history of a battle among disciplines about their disciplinary, nonnational
“territories” (Becher and Trowler 2001).9
These disciplinary organisations share scientifically much more with
disciplinary organisations in other countries than they share with any other
science discipline within the same countries. No academic in any country
shares as a theorist anything national with all other academics that would
allow them to scientifically gather as a national science entity as the
category of national science communities, according to all the critical
discourses populating the world sciences, insinuates. Academics in all
countries and across the disciplines are subordinated to their specific
national science policies, funding policies, and laws framing their
academic activities. However, this joint political infrastructure does not
constitute the academic subject of a national entity.
People in the post‒World War II world project of a world consisting
of nation-states are constructed as national subjects, citizens, and as
scientists that the bourgeois model of sciences constructs in the world of
science along a specialisation of knowledge, a specialisation that reflects
the knowledge needs of the bourgeois society, its economy, and its politics,
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9 See Wallerstein et al. (1996); more recently, see Becher and Trowler (2011).
not along their nationalities and their accordingly constructed science
disciplines. More than that, the era of globalisation has created science as a
global resource the globally competing nation-states and global “players”
are trying to get under their local command.
In this globalised sciences world, the construct of national science
communities only occurs in the practical political and institutional access
that nation-states establish on academics, treating all academics alike by
disregarding their scientific peculiarities and disregarding their nationalities
as if they were nothing else but a national resource for the international
economic battles nation-states initiate and supervise.
Moreover, those who propose the notion of the “national science
communities” have apparently not yet noticed that in the era of
globalisation, the globalisation of capitalism under the global supervision
of those imperial nation-states, who have a global reach, the whole world is
considered as a resource for economic growth, if possible invoiced in the
currencies of the imperial powers, including the world’s people and also
including the world’s professional thinkers. One’s nationality is the least
thing a globalist imperialist would care about. A glimpse on the
nationalities of academics in the leading Western universities would reveal
how irrelevant nationalities today in the practice of national science
policies are. Only critical academics, who believe and seeming share the
nation-state view of the era of colonialism, are concerned about national
science communities and consider, caught by their blind and vain view of
their rankings about global prestige, the nationality of academics as a
relevant category under which they gather academics in their imaginary
subject of the global science arena.
From this̶very outdated̶political perspective, and only from this
perspective, the critique of the world science arena, which uncritically
accommodates its views and operates with this view of the national
political elites on the world science arena, these critical reflections about
the world sciences̶very consequently̶occasionally finds allies in the
political elites or even in the̶very updated̶political and economic
imperialism of the real world powers. Accordingly, the same critique rarely
detects the political elites in the̶developing̶countries of their own
nationality as those who do dictate the “unequal,” “asymmetric,” or
“imperial” conditions under which their “national science communities”
are expected to compete and occasionally sympathize with and speculate
on how shifts in the global imperial power balances between the political
and economic imperialists could have an impact on the global ranking of
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their “dependent” science communities.10
C. Critiquing the Western Way of Theorizing
Unlike those two above critique strands caught in the Western science
concept and in the political national missions of academics in a globalised
(science) world, there is also a critique that questions the bourgeois
concept of science. This critique focuses on two aspects of the bourgeois
sciences:
Concerned with the observation of a world guided by armies of
scientists and the ideological effects the Western theories have on the
world, namely, the world of the developing countries, the rationale
of̶what this critique calls̶the Western concept of rationalism becomes
a subject of critique. The other version of critique critically discusses
another very correct observation that is that despite of all the armies of
scientists, social sciences theories play a very ideological but no practical
role in practical considerations of citizens; instead they are mainly the
subject of the exclusive discourses among the professional knowledge
experts, the academics. Those who subscribe to this critique rightly observe
that the world employs masses of people who are professional thinkers, but
the knowledge they create does not anywhere guide anyone’s practical life,
except the academic disputes among the professional thinkers about their
thoughts.
Critique of theories and of the way of theorizing is an elementary
ingredient of the Westerns concept of science. As long as one respects the
rules of the Western science, that is his or her methodological apparatus,
which defines what can be acknowledged as scientific knowledge and what
not, one can write any nonsense and present this as sound scientific
knowledge.11 However, if one critiques these definitions, defining what
science is and what not, adherents of European science are very good at
denouncing those who dare disregard or oppose their holy enlightened
definitions of science. It is the missionary view on the world that European
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10 As an example F. Alatas, who frankly speculates and expresses his disappointments about the
imperial power of Japan and its effects on the global science power distribution: “Here it would
be interesting to speculate about how academic dependency may be affected by the shifts in the
balance of economic power. It is not uncommon in Asia to hear optimistic views to the effect that
if Asian economies overtake the West, Asian culture will become more dominant globally: . . .
But, it is doubtful that any Asian nation or Asia as a whole would become dominant in the social
sciences on a global scale. The case of Japan is instructive in this case. Japan is a world economy
power but it is not a social science power by any means” (Alatas 2003: 605).
science have,12 convinced about their model of science as the science of
mankind, that prevents them from responding to critique with critique, but
rather with denouncing their critics. Societies and scientists around the
world have thus received their racist labels.13 Their insulting weight is
politically carefully distinguished and dosed dependent on how much they
are politically predetermined as an enemy for the US imperialism’ s
ambition to decide about the “good and the evil.” While Africans are
(today) politically irrelevant to the global Western crusaders, they
nonetheless are insulted as being “incurably obscure,” while the Islamic
world, which dares to refuse adjusting their societies to the Western
model, and who create their own Islamic science approach, receives as a
response the threat of a “clash of civilisations” (Huntington 1996).14 So
what is this critique that attracts such insulting responses?
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11 To illustrate this with one example, here from economic theories: The title of the book of the
latest Nobel Prize winner, Sims, is “Macroeconomics and Reality.” Within the bourgeois model
of thoughts, stating that thoughts are the product of the fantasy of the thinker he then compares
with the real world, are reward with a Nobel Prize. In fact, his book title already frankly reveals
that the “Macroeconomics,” his thoughts about the macro-economy must be no thoughts about
the real macro-economy, otherwise these thoughts could not be compared with the “Reality.”
The other pole of his comparative construct, the “Reality,” presented as the most possible radical
abstraction possible, the reality, can also not be any phenomena in the real economy, since this
economy cannot be theoretically grasped with the notion of the “Reality.” While thinking about
the economy the highly rewarded thoughts of this thinker obviously travel between hypothetical
assumptions he calls “Macroeconomics” and a “Reality” he creates for his cognitive journey
between his theoretical models and a reality he has modeled for this journey. Thoughts like this
are therefore not at risk of being ruled out of contention for the Nobel Prize. Discussing the
favourite assumptions of a demand/supply equation he states: “In principle we realize that it does
not make sense to regard ‘demand for meat’ and ‘demand for shoes’ as the products of distinct
behaviour, any more than it would make sense to regard ‘price of meat’ and ‘price of shoes’
equations as products of distinct categories of behaviour if we normalized so as to reverse the
place of prices and quantities in the system. Nonetheless, we do sometimes estimate a small part
of a complete demand system with part of a complete supply system ‒ supply and demand for
meat say. In doing this, it is common and reasonable to make shrewd aggregations and exclusion
restrictions so that our small partial-equilibrium system omits most of the many prices we know
enter the demand relation in principle and possibly include a shrewdly selected set of exogenous
variable we expect to be especially important in explaining variation in meat demand (e.g., and
Easter dummy in regions where many people buy hams for Easter dinner)” (Sims 1980: 2).
Where the modeled thoughts do not coincide with the modeled reality, the reality is adjusted to
the model via shrewd aggregations. This is the most common free floating way of speculative
thinking in the bourgeois sciences, rightly rewarded with a Nobel Prize.
C1. Critique from African Thinkers―Trapped by the Cognitive
Warship of Facts?
The critique coming from African scholars as from other parts of the world
about the Western way of theorizing always assembles around an
opposition of the notion of the rationalism of Western sciences, which is a
response to the Western critique of an “incurable religious Africa,” which
means an irrational Africa. I will neither trace nor discuss in this section all
the elaborated philosophical arguments implied in the most elaborated
critique African scholars have about the Western concept of science. Since
the notion of an “incurable religious Africa” is anyway only an insult about
their incurable nature and which rejects any critical discussions with
African scholars about their critique of the Western science, these insults
are also not my issue.
In this section I just want to draw the attention to one implication, one
assumption in the critique African scholars phrase when opposing the
“Hegemonic Science”: Critique Strands, Counterstrategies, and their Paradigmatic Premises
47
12 To illustrate this cognitive attitude of Western social scientists I quote from a book titled Nations
Matter by Craig Calhoun. According to the book cover, “Nations Matter argues that pursuing a
purely postnational politics is premature at best and possibly dangerous.” The first sentence of
the “President of the Social Science Research Council” in this book is this one: “Nationalism is
not a moral mistake” (all Calhoun 2007). My point quoting this is not to argue about
nationalism. A world of nation-states are the project of the US post‒World War II imperialism
and that a president of the social science research council celebrates nationalism as the analytical
perspective for social scientists confirms that he is the best president. I only quote this to point
out the religiouslike jargon of a leading Western social scientist, an attitude in which his views
are presented to the world as if they the sacred commands from a world social science messiah.
Similarly Wallerstein: Though Wallerstein is not a person one would suspect of harboring US
imperial thoughts, in his latest publication, arguing heavily against “European universalism”
(Wallerstein 2006), he discusses at length under the headline “Whose Right to Intervene?
Universal Values against Barbarism”, bothering the world with the scruples of left US
intellectuals with the question, what circumstances would cleanly legitimize military
interventions and discusses the missionary activities of Las Casas, most obviously to build a
congenial memorial for Immanuel Wallerstein.
13 As an example, Nisbett, who has gained a reputation as being sympathetic with with East Asian
thinking, denounces his students coming from East Asia in the more sophisticated style of a
Western science patriarch: “The truth is, however, that this linear rhetoric form is not at all
common in the East. For my Asian students, I find that the linear rhetoric form is the last crucial
thing they learn on their road to becoming fully functioning social scientists” (Nisbett 2005:
196). See also the chapter in this book by Okamoto.
14 The more diplomatic version, phrased by the scientific spokesmen of an imperial power, that
would like to question the US science imperialism, is articulated in the so-called Metris Report,
written on behalf of the European Commission by an Expert Group with leading European
scholars (European Commission 2009).
“Western rationalism.” African scholars consider this Western rationalism
“as no longer valued without contestation” (Mbembe 2000: 27) and
advocate “the recognition of the existence of forms of knowledge distinct
from scientific knowledge…the multiplicity of worlds and forms of life,
the existence of narrative knowledge distinct from scientific knowledge,
the plurality of forms of invention of difference and the universal, the
redefinition of relations between objectivity and representation” (ibid.).
Logically very similar to the aforementioned critique of Western
theories as “nonapplicable” to the non-Western world, it is remarkable to
notice that the critique coming from African scholars also contests Western
rationalism by advocating the recognition of other forms of knowledge
“distinct from scientific knowledge.” Their opposition to the Western
concept of science is not opposing the Western form of scientific
knowledge, but its exclusive definition of what counts as scientific
knowledge.
This is remarkable since advocating other forms of knowledge as a
critique of the Western concept of science, the Western concept of
theorizing as an exclusive rationalism, apparently considers the Western
rationalism as a rational way of thinking.15
The modern Western social sciences̶thoughts traveling between
their imaginary theoretical ex ante models, assumptive theories,
hypotheses, and the like, and their descriptive perception of the facts, a
never understood and methodologically manipulated phenomenology,
established as the instance for proving what they call the “evidence” of
thoughts̶this is supposed to be rationale? Theories, compressed in
concepts like “modernity,” the market imagined and proved with
accordingly constructed facts as an equalizer of demand and supply, an
economic theory taking scarcity as the founding element of an economy
that dumps and produces everyday values this theory does not even know
how to count, not to mention to explain, political theories thinking the
nation-state as ever solving problems only a nation-state can ever create,
and so on and on̶all these most inconsistent and preoccupied thoughts, an
epistemology that preferably proves the impossibility of objective science
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15 See also J. B. Quedraogo and Carlos Cardoso, Reading in Methodology, African Perspectives
(CODESRIA, 2011). This volume focuses on critical epistemological and methodological
discussion of the Western science approach. It should however be stressed that as much as such
epistemological debates help theory go beyond the level of social science engineering, they
cannot replace any critique of the Western theories.
the Western sciences believe they are practicing, all this is supposed to be
rational theories and a rational approach to theorizing?
Is this African critique, that hesitates to oppose this way of theorizing
other than complimenting it with other types of knowledge, may be also a
victim of the reflexive realism, the descriptive view of the bourgeois
science, they here apply to their reflections about the Western science
approach, trapped by the methodological apparatus of the Western
sciences? Does this critique possibly mix up the rationale appearance of
the bourgeois concept of science, presented via its sophisticated methodological
apparatus with the irrationalism of the cognitive architecture of Western
theories? Do they mix up in their critique the rational appearance with a
theoretically irrational thinking not drawn from the Western theories but
from the ideological impact Western thoughts have on thoughts in Africa,
and believe this to be the result of a Western rationalism. Do they possibly
mean that the effects Western theories have on African thoughts is the
result of a scientific rationalism, because they, the Western theories,
present themselves as being methodologically rational? Is this critique also
a victim of looking at the very facts about the Western science, trapped by
their warship of facts, here by the fact of a methodologically presented
rationalism, that allows the presentation of the most bizarre preoccupied
thoughts as rational, once they can prove these to be constructed according
to the rules of their methodological apparatus. Is there anything this
concept of science cannot prove, preferably in their epistemological
departments proving the impossibility of rational knowledge?
C2. Critique from the Islamic Social Science Approach―Opposing the
Expropriation with a Twofold Expropriation from Knowledge
The most striking irrationalism of the Western societies, of the global
capitalism and their political systems, democracy, certainly is that this
society has established and institutionalised sciences to a greater extent
than ever before in history, established institutions, universities, with
armies of professionally thinkers̶and denies the knowledge they produce
has any say in the decision makings of this society. Not only in the sense
that the political decisions can only be made by another professional elite,
the politicians, and are strictly a matter of the political spheres, decisions in
which the knowledge of sciences is not allowed to take part, unless as the
provider of nonbinding advice; this society also distinguishes its citizens as
professional knowledge holders and knowledge consumers (See Kuhn
2007: 11ff). The latter get pieces of knowledge to prove their appropriateness
“Hegemonic Science”: Critique Strands, Counterstrategies, and their Paradigmatic Premises
49
for the higher level of jobs, ruling the rest. More than that, the creation of
knowledge has even gained the ideological status of governing a
“knowledge-based society” while at the same time in a very fundamental
sense decisions about any aspects of people’s lives are not taken in relation
to knowledge but to the rules, lawful considerations about life priorities,
transformed into indisputable moral principles, and finally established with
the political power of the political elites and the ideological power of the
professional thinkers. Decisions guided by knowledge but violating laws
are thought not a matter of debates, but of sanctions.
This political definition of the role knowledge does and does not play
in a society that creates knowledge for other purposes, disempowering
people’s decisions from knowledge and subordinating their decisions under
the power of laws, internalised as the moral principles of life, is the
political reason for the dogma of a relativism of scientific knowledge,
which many epistemologically engaged philosophers have so passionately
proven to be a necessity of the nature of scientific thinking. Indeed, if
knowledge must be ever subjective it cannot serve as an instance of any
decision making.
It is precisely this mind set separating knowledge from the practical
concerns and considerations of decision making in the bourgeois concept
of science,16 implied in the dogma of its knowledge relativism, that the
Islamic critique addresses in its opposition to the Western approach to
science.
“Knowledge” falls short of expressing all the aspects of ’ilm.
Knowledge in the Western world means information about something,
divine or corporeal, while ’ilm is an all-embracing term covering
theory, action and education. (Ahktar, n.d.)
Their critique hits the above-mentioned point when they critique the
Western concept of knowledge. The notion that the concept of ilm embraces
“theory, action and education” opposes the Western concept of science by
insisting on knowledge as a means for the concerns of societal practices.
However fueling the lacking practical dimension of knowledge with
the moral ideas of the religion of Islam does make knowledge a practically
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16 The notion “This is only theory” illustrates the role theorizing plays in the mind architecture of
the bourgeois citizen. Theory is denounced as being practically irrelevant, theory is wishful
thinking.
relevant instance in thinking, but it introduces cognitive instances that
define thoughts beforehand with the moral ideas of this religion and directs
thinking toward given results, postulated by their religious beliefs. Thus the
Islamic concept of knowledge, which considers knowledge as an instance
of the societal practices, binds this thinking to the moral framework of their
religiously preoccupied assumptions.17
In addition to this, in the Islamic concept of knowledge, rightly
critiquing the split mind in the Western concept of knowledge delegating
knowing into a sphere separated from practically thinking about the world
of action, the concept of ’ilm implies a religiously motivated variation of
the Western politically motivated elite distinction in knowledge holders
and knowledge consumers. It distinguishes ’ilm into a hierarchy of
knowledge levels the highest one of which can only be reached by a
religiously defined elite.18
Once the Islamic concept of knowledge distinguishes between the
type of thinking of an enlightened cognitive elite, exclusively gaining the
stage of “knowledge by the unity of subject and object” and thinking that
never reaches this unity guided by the ideas of religious beliefs, this
thinking cannot know, it compliments the interventions of a lawful
thinking the Western societies provide for the ordinary knowledge holders
as the way of building their obedient minds with a twofold morally guided
and a lawfully thinking mind, supervised by an chosen political and
religiously enthroned elite.
Rightly arguing against the Western concept of knowledge that
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17 Introducing the moral principles guiding thinking toward religiously defines societal practices
also conflicts with the ideas of knowledge, as the controversial discourses among the Islam
sciences show. Their ongoing debate about whether scepticism can be considered as a creative
element in the creation of thoughts or eroding the basis of believing illustrates the
epistemological contradictions of introducing the moral ideas of a religion into scientific
thinking. “It is generally believed that in Islam, as far as belief is concerned, there is no place for
doubting and questioning the existence of God, the prophethood of Hadrat Muhammad (S) and
the Divine injunctions, that Islam requires unequivocal submission to its dictates. This general
belief is a misconception in the light of Islam’s emphasis on ’aql. In the matter of the
fundamentals of faith (usu-l al-Din), the believer is obliged to accept tawhid, nubuwwah and
ma’d (in the Shi’i faith, ’adl, i.e. Divine Justice, and imamah are also fundamentals of faith) on
rational grounds or on the basis of one’s existential experience. This ensures that there is room
for doubt and skepticism in Islam before reaching certainty in Iman” (Ahktar).
18 “The sufis have described iman as consisting of three stages: ’ilmal-yaqin (certain knowledge),
’ayn al-yaqin (knowledge by sight) and haqq al-yaqin (knowledge by the unity of subject and
object). The last stage is attainable by an elect few” (ibid).
expropriates thinking from its societal practices and reserving the highest
level of knowing for a chosen elite, and complimenting the subordination
of thinking under a lawful thinking in the Western concept of knowledge
with the subordination of thinking under the moral ideas of the Islamic
religion, is a critique of the Western sciences, but a critique that adds
another binding moral instance to an already morally misguided concept of
knowledge.
Conclusions
The history of thoughts seems to progress via an opposition constructed in
alternative ways of doing the same.
The strongest, if not the weapon of the Western sciences against their
critics is their concept of critique. More precisely critiquing theories is the
mode this approach to science has established together with the
universalisation of its concept of science.
The relativism of hypothetical thinking implies a concept of critique
that discusses theories via investigating the methodological apparatus with
which the theories are constructed, not the thoughts of the theories
themselves. Any theory is acknowledged that supports its whatever
preoccupied thoughts, its hypotheses, with their proof through the facts,
facts the theory constructs with the methodological apparatus through the
perspective of its hypothetic thoughts; thus there are no facts the
methodological apparatus could not provide for the hypothetical thoughts,
since the facts are nothing but the constructed illustrations created and
interpreted through the assumptive thoughts. This circular relation between
the thinker and his object of thinking implies the epistemological necessity
that all thoughts that can be proved by the facts this thinking constructs for
its proof, proving them as “evident” thoughts.
Relativizing thoughts, in the first place relativizing thoughts that
articulate critique, is an epistemological necessity in this bourgeois concept
of thinking. In this model of thinking, critique can only articulate
alternative thoughts, alternative assumptive theories also proved by the
facts it constructs for its proof.
It is only this format of critiquing theories that can intervene into
theorizing in this concept of thoughts by complimenting other, in the same
way proved thoughts, created and proved with the same circular procedure.
It is this format of critique that stimulates critique as an ever-reactivated
impulse for the creation of an ever-relativized knowledge and that at the
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same time immunizes knowledge against a critique that would trace any
thoughts.
In this circular world of competing proved and relativized theories,
the discourses among the holders of this knowledge can only prove the
validity of their relative thoughts against others by monopolizing the
production and publication of relativized theories. Monopolizing
relativized thoughts is the only way to relativize their relativity.
Monopolizing, that is, aiming at a leadership of thoughts by dominating the
world of thoughts, is therefore the way this concept of science serves the
cognitive impetus in scientific thinking seeking knowledge, its concept of
cognition denies.
It is a tragic mistake to oppose the Western monopoly on theorizing,
since monopolizing thoughts and arguing about the monopolisation of
thoughts is the essential part of the Western sciences. Questioning this
monopoly and building alternative local knowledge regimes opposes the
Western sciences, but it opposes them by imitating, thus reinforcing the
Western science approach, responding to the Western leadership in
theorizing by struggle over scientific leadership.
Questioning the thoughts of the Western theories, and thus eroding the
universal reign of Western thoughts, is not what the above discussed
variations of critique do. Critiquing, not complimenting, thoughts is not an
option the Western model of thinking knows. However, the fact that
Western sciences only know this format of a relativized critique does not
mean that it is not possible. It is epistemologically “forbidden.” That is why
it is necessary and the only way to critique.
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